Heidegger on
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I am happy to share my papers
on request
on request
Heidegger on
Being Uncanny
Harvard University Press, 2015
Existential Crises
Forthcoming in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Existentialism, eds. Megan Altman, Kevin Aho, Hans Pederson
This chapter defines ‘existential crisis’, identifies six types of existential crises, and shows how existentialist philosophy arises out of lived existential crises in order to help people to understand and to navigate those crises. I argue that the concepts that existentialism has developed to understand existential crises to date are necessary in order to help us to understand and to navigate the existential crisis of the impending climate catastrophe.
This chapter defines ‘existential crisis’, identifies six types of existential crises, and shows how existentialist philosophy arises out of lived existential crises in order to help people to understand and to navigate those crises. I argue that the concepts that existentialism has developed to understand existential crises to date are necessary in order to help us to understand and to navigate the existential crisis of the impending climate catastrophe.
The Resonant Principle of Reason
forthcoming in Heidegger on Logic, ed. Dan Dahlstrom and Filippo Casati, Cambridge University Press.
The principle of sufficient reason is a logical principle first fully formulated by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. It holds that “there can be found no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition, without there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise, although we cannot know these reasons in most cases” (Leibniz 1989, 646). What virtue of thinking does the principle of sufficient reason guarantee, and why did the principle have to wait for Leibniz for its full formulation? Heidegger addresses these two issues in his 1955-1956 lecture course “The Principle of Reason” (Der Satz vom Grund) at the University of Freiburg and in his 1956 address of the same title. Heidegger leads his audience through a series of meditations on the principle of reason and the principle of sufficient reason, which he claims is necessary preparation for coming to hear the claim that the principle of reason as such makes on us, as well as for coming to understand why it has appeared as it has in the history of philosophy (PR, 52 / GA10, 77). In this essay, my goal is to reconstruct Heidegger’s interpretation of the principle of reason as a principle that resonates variously in the history of philosophy.
The principle of sufficient reason is a logical principle first fully formulated by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. It holds that “there can be found no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition, without there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise, although we cannot know these reasons in most cases” (Leibniz 1989, 646). What virtue of thinking does the principle of sufficient reason guarantee, and why did the principle have to wait for Leibniz for its full formulation? Heidegger addresses these two issues in his 1955-1956 lecture course “The Principle of Reason” (Der Satz vom Grund) at the University of Freiburg and in his 1956 address of the same title. Heidegger leads his audience through a series of meditations on the principle of reason and the principle of sufficient reason, which he claims is necessary preparation for coming to hear the claim that the principle of reason as such makes on us, as well as for coming to understand why it has appeared as it has in the history of philosophy (PR, 52 / GA10, 77). In this essay, my goal is to reconstruct Heidegger’s interpretation of the principle of reason as a principle that resonates variously in the history of philosophy.
The Trouble with the Ontological Difference
forthcoming in The Cambridge Critical Guide to Being and Time, ed. Aaron James Wendland, Cambridge University Press
The ontological difference is the difference or distinction between entities (things that are) and being (that by virtue of which entities are). Although it is not named until 1927’s The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (BPP17), the ontological difference is the basic principle of Heidegger’s philosophy. Yet, shortly after Being and Time, the ontological difference comes to seem deeply problematic to Heidegger. In order to understand the ontological difference, on which Heidegger’s philosophy is built, we must come to be similarly troubled by it. We must “try to set out what is problematic about this distinction […] in order to gain a foothold in the problem: not so much to solve it, but in order to have an opportunity to continually bring closer to us what is enigmatic about this issue that is the most self-evident of everything self-evident” (FCM356-357). I will do this by trying to identify what reason or reasons there might be for holding that there is a distinction between entities and being. Trying to understand why we should distinguish between being and entities will also allow me to articulate more precisely what lies on each side of the distinction.
The ontological difference is the difference or distinction between entities (things that are) and being (that by virtue of which entities are). Although it is not named until 1927’s The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (BPP17), the ontological difference is the basic principle of Heidegger’s philosophy. Yet, shortly after Being and Time, the ontological difference comes to seem deeply problematic to Heidegger. In order to understand the ontological difference, on which Heidegger’s philosophy is built, we must come to be similarly troubled by it. We must “try to set out what is problematic about this distinction […] in order to gain a foothold in the problem: not so much to solve it, but in order to have an opportunity to continually bring closer to us what is enigmatic about this issue that is the most self-evident of everything self-evident” (FCM356-357). I will do this by trying to identify what reason or reasons there might be for holding that there is a distinction between entities and being. Trying to understand why we should distinguish between being and entities will also allow me to articulate more precisely what lies on each side of the distinction.
Having Some Regard for Human Frailty: On Finitude and Humanity
forthcoming in Heidegger and the Human, eds. Jeff Malpas and Ingo Farin
As Heidegger presents it in the existential analytic in Being and Time, the primary challenge of being the sort of entity that we are is having the right sort of regard for our frailty. We usually think of human frailties as arising from the vulnerabilities of the body – to injury, sickness, debility, and death. But, for Heidegger, our frailty is not tied to our embodiment, since we are not essentially bodies but instead cases of Dasein, the entity that understands being. The understander of being will be vulnerable in a distinctively existential-ontological way. I argue that our existential-ontological finitude rests not on our human bodies but on our being-amidst-entities and being-with-others, and I suggest that having proper regard for this finitude is what allows us to manifest the very best of our humanity.
As Heidegger presents it in the existential analytic in Being and Time, the primary challenge of being the sort of entity that we are is having the right sort of regard for our frailty. We usually think of human frailties as arising from the vulnerabilities of the body – to injury, sickness, debility, and death. But, for Heidegger, our frailty is not tied to our embodiment, since we are not essentially bodies but instead cases of Dasein, the entity that understands being. The understander of being will be vulnerable in a distinctively existential-ontological way. I argue that our existential-ontological finitude rests not on our human bodies but on our being-amidst-entities and being-with-others, and I suggest that having proper regard for this finitude is what allows us to manifest the very best of our humanity.
Posthuman Dasein
After showing that the human being and Dasein are not identical, I argue that a posthuman can be a case of Dasein. To be a case of Dasein is to take up a life-defining project that is vulnerable to having to be surrendered because it depends on both other cases of Dasein and ready-to-hand entities. This vulnerability does not require a material or biological body and so can be manifested by posthumans, such as Alan Moore's Doctor Manhattan (Watchmen). I argue further that, while Doctor Manhattan is an inauthentic case of posthuman Dasein, authentic cases of posthuman Dasein are possible and may, in fact, point us beyond the era of technological enframing.
| withy_-_posthuman_dasein.pdf |
We Are a Conversation: Heidegger on How Language Uncovers
forthcoming in Language and Phenomenology, ed. Chad Engelland, Routledge
For Heidegger, phenomenology consists in seeking the logos of the phenomena, where the logos “lets something be seen (phainesthai)”. To take the logos as the object of phenomenology is thus to let be seen how the logos lets be seen: how language uncovers. In this paper, I develop a unified account of how language uncovers, drawing from a variety of Heidegger’s texts over different periods in his thinking. I take as my guiding thread the analysis of discourse in Being and Time, following Heidegger’s own directive in 1953-1954 to “read Section 34 in Being and Time more closely” in order to better understand his much later views on language. Overall, I argue that viewing language as a site of phenomenological uncovering leads us to see it not as a stockpile of word-tools or as a static framework of meaning but as a dynamic and creative conversation.
Heidegger on Human Being: the Living Thing Having Logos
forthcoming in Human: A History, ed. Karolina Hübner. Oxford University Press
This paper interprets Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time-era account of us as ‘Dasein’ as an appropriation of Aristotle’s definition of us as the living thing that has logos. As Heidegger understands it, to have logos is not to be rational but to be synthesising or gathering, where this means that we (i) gather entities into practical contexts and so into their being that, what, and how they are, (ii) gather ourselves into social contexts and so into being who we are, and (iii) gather the three dimensions of our temporality together into our being as Dasein. This gathering can occur authentically or inauthentically, which is to say that we can gather well or poorly. Gathering excellently is the ethico-ontological challenge of being Dasein that we are called to take up.
This paper interprets Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time-era account of us as ‘Dasein’ as an appropriation of Aristotle’s definition of us as the living thing that has logos. As Heidegger understands it, to have logos is not to be rational but to be synthesising or gathering, where this means that we (i) gather entities into practical contexts and so into their being that, what, and how they are, (ii) gather ourselves into social contexts and so into being who we are, and (iii) gather the three dimensions of our temporality together into our being as Dasein. This gathering can occur authentically or inauthentically, which is to say that we can gather well or poorly. Gathering excellently is the ethico-ontological challenge of being Dasein that we are called to take up.
Finding Oneself, Called
In Heidegger on Affect, ed. Christos Hadjioannou. Palgrave MacMillan, 2019.
This paper situates Heidegger’s account of moods and affects in its original philosophical and methodological home: his account of disclosing as our original human openness. The dimension of disclosing to which affects belong is finding, or findingness (Befindlichkeit). I argue that to be finding is to be called by vocational projects (e.g., in ground-moods like angst and boredom) and to be called by the solicitings of entities, not only in being mooded but also in sensing and in being normatively responsive (among others). This wider perspective on Heidegger’s thinking of affectivity yields the proper context in which to understand and assess what he says about moods, as well as a powerful framework within which to understand affective disclosing generally, as the phenomenon of finding oneself called.
This paper situates Heidegger’s account of moods and affects in its original philosophical and methodological home: his account of disclosing as our original human openness. The dimension of disclosing to which affects belong is finding, or findingness (Befindlichkeit). I argue that to be finding is to be called by vocational projects (e.g., in ground-moods like angst and boredom) and to be called by the solicitings of entities, not only in being mooded but also in sensing and in being normatively responsive (among others). This wider perspective on Heidegger’s thinking of affectivity yields the proper context in which to understand and assess what he says about moods, as well as a powerful framework within which to understand affective disclosing generally, as the phenomenon of finding oneself called.
'Still, The Unrest of the Question of Being'
In After Heidegger?, ed. Richard Polt and Gregory Fried, Roman & Littlefield, 2018.
Being and Time begins by asking, “Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word ‘being’ [seiend]?” (SZ1). Heidegger’s project is thus often understood as an attempt to answer this question of being. But Heidegger immediately goes on to say that the problem is not that we lack an answer to this question so much as that we do not even have a sense of the question: “But are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the expression ‘Being’ [Sein]? Not at all” (SZ1). Instead of, or at least before, giving us an answer to the question of being, Heidegger wishes to gift us the openness of that question. I argue that the question of being asks after the meaningful presencing of entities, where this means it asks what it is to hold entities up to, or grasp them in light of, ontological standards. I show that the metaphors of holding, grasping, and light mask a deep perplexity about this phenomenon, and I suggest that the ontological-epistemological problem of being that Heidegger wants to bequeath to us has general philosophical significance beyond the scope of his own philosophising.
Being and Time begins by asking, “Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word ‘being’ [seiend]?” (SZ1). Heidegger’s project is thus often understood as an attempt to answer this question of being. But Heidegger immediately goes on to say that the problem is not that we lack an answer to this question so much as that we do not even have a sense of the question: “But are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the expression ‘Being’ [Sein]? Not at all” (SZ1). Instead of, or at least before, giving us an answer to the question of being, Heidegger wishes to gift us the openness of that question. I argue that the question of being asks after the meaningful presencing of entities, where this means it asks what it is to hold entities up to, or grasp them in light of, ontological standards. I show that the metaphors of holding, grasping, and light mask a deep perplexity about this phenomenon, and I suggest that the ontological-epistemological problem of being that Heidegger wants to bequeath to us has general philosophical significance beyond the scope of his own philosophising.
'Thinking Failure in The War in Iraq: The Cultural Turn and the Concept of 'World''
Co-authored with Jon Askonas.
in Why Philosophy?, eds. Paolo Diego Bubbio and Jeff Malpas. De Gruyter, 2019.
By 2006, the U.S. Army was in trouble in Iraq. Senior U.S. political and military leaders had intended to conduct an operation that would have a ‘light footprint’, with the majority of troops withdrawn within six months. But the ‘war in Iraq’ became a long-term occupation and counterinsurgency effort. Soldiers who had been trained to invade did not have the skills for post-invasion operations, counterinsurgency, and long-term engagement with a civilian population. To address the latter, the Army turned to cultural training, aiming to foster both ‘cultural awareness’ and ‘cultural sensitivity’ in its soldiers. But the concept of culture did not solve the problem that it was supposed to. Culture might have explained to soldiers why Iraqis acted in some of the ways that they did, but it did not allow soldiers to better interact with Iraqis. For this, the Army would have needed a different concept, which we suggest is the phenomenological concept of world.
in Why Philosophy?, eds. Paolo Diego Bubbio and Jeff Malpas. De Gruyter, 2019.
By 2006, the U.S. Army was in trouble in Iraq. Senior U.S. political and military leaders had intended to conduct an operation that would have a ‘light footprint’, with the majority of troops withdrawn within six months. But the ‘war in Iraq’ became a long-term occupation and counterinsurgency effort. Soldiers who had been trained to invade did not have the skills for post-invasion operations, counterinsurgency, and long-term engagement with a civilian population. To address the latter, the Army turned to cultural training, aiming to foster both ‘cultural awareness’ and ‘cultural sensitivity’ in its soldiers. But the concept of culture did not solve the problem that it was supposed to. Culture might have explained to soldiers why Iraqis acted in some of the ways that they did, but it did not allow soldiers to better interact with Iraqis. For this, the Army would have needed a different concept, which we suggest is the phenomenological concept of world.
'Haugeland's Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Normativity '
In European Journal of Philosophy,
Vol. 25, Issue 2, June 2017, pp. 463-484.
John Haugeland’s distinctive approach to Heidegger’s ontology rests on taking scientific explanation to be a paradigmatic case of understanding the being of entities. I argue that this paradigm, and the more general account that Haugeland develops from it, misses a crucial component of Heidegger’s picture: the dynamic character of being. While this dimension of being first comes to the fore after Being and Time, it should have been present all along. Its absence grounds Heidegger’s persistent confusion about whether world is an entity, as well as problems that both Haugeland’s Heidegger and Heidegger’s Plato run into with the ontological difference. Retrieving the dynamic character of being reveals the proper object of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology as well as a distinctive feature of his metaphysics of normativity, which is all but impossible to see if we grasp Heidegger’s account through the special case of scientific explanation – at least as usually understood.
Vol. 25, Issue 2, June 2017, pp. 463-484.
John Haugeland’s distinctive approach to Heidegger’s ontology rests on taking scientific explanation to be a paradigmatic case of understanding the being of entities. I argue that this paradigm, and the more general account that Haugeland develops from it, misses a crucial component of Heidegger’s picture: the dynamic character of being. While this dimension of being first comes to the fore after Being and Time, it should have been present all along. Its absence grounds Heidegger’s persistent confusion about whether world is an entity, as well as problems that both Haugeland’s Heidegger and Heidegger’s Plato run into with the ontological difference. Retrieving the dynamic character of being reveals the proper object of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology as well as a distinctive feature of his metaphysics of normativity, which is all but impossible to see if we grasp Heidegger’s account through the special case of scientific explanation – at least as usually understood.
'Concealing and Concealment in Heidegger'
European Journal of Philosophy,
Vol. 25, Issue 4, December 2017, pp. 1496-1513.
DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12236
The self-concealing of being is a primary preoccupation of Heidegger’s later thought, but neither Heidegger nor his interpreters have made clear precisely what it is. In this paper, I identify the self-concealing of being as the concealing of the worlding of the world (note: not of the world), which is essential to and simultaneous with that worlding. In order to establish this, I sketch a taxonomy of the various phenomena of concealing and concealment in Heidegger’s work by building on Mark Wrathall’s four ‘planks’ of unconcealing and concealment. Importantly, I distinguish the procedurally prior concealment (lēthē) that all unconcealing (alētheia) presupposes from the simultaneous concealing (kruptein, kruptesthai) that Heidegger frequently confuses it with. This distinction not only allows us to get clear on what it means to say that being conceals itself but also reveals various confusions and obscurities in Heidegger’s own thought as well as in that of his readers.
Vol. 25, Issue 4, December 2017, pp. 1496-1513.
DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12236
The self-concealing of being is a primary preoccupation of Heidegger’s later thought, but neither Heidegger nor his interpreters have made clear precisely what it is. In this paper, I identify the self-concealing of being as the concealing of the worlding of the world (note: not of the world), which is essential to and simultaneous with that worlding. In order to establish this, I sketch a taxonomy of the various phenomena of concealing and concealment in Heidegger’s work by building on Mark Wrathall’s four ‘planks’ of unconcealing and concealment. Importantly, I distinguish the procedurally prior concealment (lēthē) that all unconcealing (alētheia) presupposes from the simultaneous concealing (kruptein, kruptesthai) that Heidegger frequently confuses it with. This distinction not only allows us to get clear on what it means to say that being conceals itself but also reveals various confusions and obscurities in Heidegger’s own thought as well as in that of his readers.
In Heidegger Lexicon, ed. Mark Wrathall, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming, entries on: ‘Angst [Anxiety], Furcht [Fear]’; ‘Unheimlichkeit [Uncanniness]’; ‘Stimmung [Mood]’; ‘Geworfenheit [Thrownness]’.
Review, Matthew Ratcliffe "Experiences of Depression: A Study in Phenomenology"in Notre Dame Philosophical Review, Jul 4, 2015.
'Authenticity and Heidegger's Antigone'
The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology,
Vol. 45, No. 3, 2015. pp.239-253.
Sophocles’ Antigone is the only individual whom Heidegger names as authentic. But the usual interpretations of Heidegger’s ‘authenticity’ (as being-towards-death, taking responsibility for norms, world-historical creation, and a neo-Aristotelian phronēsis) either do not apply to Antigone or do not capture what Heidegger finds significant about her. By working through these failures, I develop an interpretation of Heideggerian authenticity that is adequate to his Antigone. The crucial step is accurately identifying the finitude to which Antigone authentically relates: what Heidegger calls ‘uncanniness’ (Unheimlichkeit). I argue that uncanniness names being’s presencing through self-withdrawal and that Antigone stands authentically towards this in her responsiveness to the call of being and her reticence at the end of explanation. In conclusion, I consider Sophocles’ own creative act, which bequeathed to the West an understanding of being and a vision of how to relate to it authentically. I argue that Sophocles’ status as a world-historical creator does not provide a competing picture of authenticity but must itself be understood as responsive and reticent.
Vol. 45, No. 3, 2015. pp.239-253.
Sophocles’ Antigone is the only individual whom Heidegger names as authentic. But the usual interpretations of Heidegger’s ‘authenticity’ (as being-towards-death, taking responsibility for norms, world-historical creation, and a neo-Aristotelian phronēsis) either do not apply to Antigone or do not capture what Heidegger finds significant about her. By working through these failures, I develop an interpretation of Heideggerian authenticity that is adequate to his Antigone. The crucial step is accurately identifying the finitude to which Antigone authentically relates: what Heidegger calls ‘uncanniness’ (Unheimlichkeit). I argue that uncanniness names being’s presencing through self-withdrawal and that Antigone stands authentically towards this in her responsiveness to the call of being and her reticence at the end of explanation. In conclusion, I consider Sophocles’ own creative act, which bequeathed to the West an understanding of being and a vision of how to relate to it authentically. I argue that Sophocles’ status as a world-historical creator does not provide a competing picture of authenticity but must itself be understood as responsive and reticent.
| withy_-_am_-_authenticity_and_heideggers_antigone.docx |
'Being and the Sea: Being as Phusis and Time'
forthcoming inDivision III of Heidegger’s Being and Time:The Unanswered Question of Being,
ed. Lee Braver, MIT Press.
ed. Lee Braver, MIT Press.
'Owned Emotions: Affective Excellence in Heidegger on Aristotle'
in Heidegger, Authenticity and the Self: Themes from Division Two of Being and Time, ed. Denis McManus, Routledge, 2015.
'The Strategic Unity of Heidegger's Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics'
in The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 51, Issue 2, June 2013. pp.161-178.
This paper unifies the disparate analyses in Heidegger’s lecture course, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, in a single therapeutic and philosophical project. By taking seriously the text’s claim to lead us towards authenticity, I show how Heidegger’s analysis of boredom works together with his comparative analysis of man and animal to diagnose and lead us out of our contemporary complacency about being. This reading puts both analyses in a new light, reveals the hidden strategic unity of the lecture course, and brings out the therapeutic dimension of Heidegger’s phenomenology.
This paper unifies the disparate analyses in Heidegger’s lecture course, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, in a single therapeutic and philosophical project. By taking seriously the text’s claim to lead us towards authenticity, I show how Heidegger’s analysis of boredom works together with his comparative analysis of man and animal to diagnose and lead us out of our contemporary complacency about being. This reading puts both analyses in a new light, reveals the hidden strategic unity of the lecture course, and brings out the therapeutic dimension of Heidegger’s phenomenology.
‘Remarks on Thomas Sheehan’s ‘Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift’’, in Proceedings of the Forty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Heidegger Circle: Supplement, 2012.
Review, Martin Heidegger Introduction to Philosophy – Thinking and Poetizing, in Notre Dame Philosophical Review, 09-2011.
'Situation and Limitation: Making Sense of Heidegger on Thrownness'
in European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 22 Issue 1, March 2014. pp. 61-81. First published online 12 June 2011.
As Heidegger acknowledges, our understanding is essentially situated and so limited by the context and tradition into which it is thrown. But this ‘situatedness’ does not exhaust Heidegger’s concept of ‘thrownness’. By examining this concept and its grammar, I develop a more complete interpretation. I identify several different kinds of finitude or limitation in our understanding, and touch on ways in which we confront and carry different dimensions of our past.
As Heidegger acknowledges, our understanding is essentially situated and so limited by the context and tradition into which it is thrown. But this ‘situatedness’ does not exhaust Heidegger’s concept of ‘thrownness’. By examining this concept and its grammar, I develop a more complete interpretation. I identify several different kinds of finitude or limitation in our understanding, and touch on ways in which we confront and carry different dimensions of our past.
'The Methodological Role of Angst in Being and Time'
in The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology,
Vol. 43, No. 2, May 2012. pp.195-211
Vol. 43, No. 2, May 2012. pp.195-211
| withy_-_am_-_the_methodological_role_of_angst_in_being_and_time_-_august_2011.doc |
